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ince the advent of the ﬂoating exchange rate
era in 1973, economists and policymakers have
been forced to cope with unexpected volatility in
exchange rates.  Such volatility can complicate the
achievement of price stability and have undesir-
able effects on output and employment—espe-
cially in small, open economies.  To counteract
troublesome currency ﬂuctuations, central banks
often intervene in foreign exchange markets—buy-
ing and selling their own currency to inﬂuence its
value.1 Such intervention raises a number of ques-
tions: How frequently do central banks intervene,
and what conditions prompt them to do so?  What
are the goals of intervention?  Does intervention
inﬂuence the exchange rate? Is intervention prof-
itable for central banks? Answering such important
questions is difﬁcult because central banks tradi-
tionally have been reluctant to release intervention
data to researchers, considering it to be too sensi-
tive.  The lack of actual intervention data has been
a major handicap to the literature on intervention
(Edison, 1993).  
Researchers have pursued several strategies
to address the lack of data.  Some researchers have
obtained and examined intervention data after
agreeing to keep details of speciﬁc transactions con-
ﬁdential (Loopesko, 1984; Mastropasqua, Micossi,
and Rinaldi, 1988; Humpage, 1999).  Others—e.g.,
Peiers, 1997; Goodhart and Hesse, 1993—have
used news reports of intervention to substitute for
actual intervention data.2 A very popular strategy
has been to use publicly available foreign exchange
reserves data to proxy for unobservable interven-
tion data.  International reserves are assets that can
be used directly for settlement of international debts,
payments to foreign countries.  Such assets include
securities, bank deposits, gold, special drawing rights
(SDRs), and reserve positions in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).  Foreign exchange reserves are
those international reserves—typically securities or
bank deposits—denominated in a foreign currency,
rather than gold or SDRs.3
Using changes in reserves to proxy for inter-
vention has permitted researchers to study inter-
vention in a much wider variety of countries and
over longer time spans than would a strategy 
of using only actual intervention data.  Taylor
(1982b), for example, estimated the proﬁtability 
of intervention for a multicountry data set using
reserve changes—modiﬁed for SDR allocations,
reserve revaluations, and other factors—as a proxy
for intervention.  A series of studies—Obstfeld,
1983; Kearney and Macdonald, 1986; Gartner,
1987 and 1991—have used changes in reserves 
to estimate ofﬁcial intervention reaction functions.
Several papers have used reserves data to examine
the extent to which intervention is sterilized or
whether it signals monetary policy (e.g., Takagi,
1991; Neumann and von Hagen, 1993).  Almekinders
(1996) examined the relationship between central
bank independence and intervention activity.  Finally,
Szakmary and Mathur (1997) used reserves data 
to investigate the relationship between technical
trading rule returns and intervention for a cross
section of countries.
The problem with these studies is that reserves
are an imperfect proxy for ofﬁcial intervention.
Reserves will change not only when central banks
conduct foreign exchange intervention operations
but also for other reasons, for instance, a govern-
ment payment of debt denominated in a foreign
currency.  The question to be addressed here is:
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1 Most research on intervention uses the term intervention to refer to
sterilized intervention, which is deﬁned in the ﬁrst boxed insert.
2 Klein (1993) ﬁnds that for U.S. intervention from 1985-89, 72 percent
of interventions were reported by the Wall Street Journal and that 88
percent of reports were correct.  
3 Potential claims that could be created through swap lines or lines of
credit do not constitute reserves.REVIEW
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How well are changes in foreign exchange reserves
correlated with ofﬁcial intervention?4
To answer this question, we compare U.S., Swiss,
and German intervention series with measures
derived from reserves data using time series graphs,
correlations, seasonal adjustment, and other statis-
tical procedures.  We consider whether any simple
adjustments can make reserves better proxies for
intervention.  We must be circumspect in our con-
clusions, however, as the three cases we use may
not be representative of the relationship between
foreign exchange reserves and intervention in other
countries—or, over other time spans.  
The next two sections of this article will describe
brieﬂy the motives for holding international reserves
and for intervening in currency markets.  The fourth
section considers reasons why changes in reserves may
not correspond perfectly to intervention. The ﬁfth
section compares changes in foreign exchange re-
serves to intervention data for the United States,
Germany, and Switzerland using time series statistics,
rolling and static correlations.  The ﬁnal section
draws conclusions and suggests avenues for further
research. 
WHY DO COUNTRIES HOLD INTERNA-
TIONAL RESERVES?
The traditional purposes for holding
international reserves have been to:
1) Directly ﬁnance international payments
imbalances; 
2) Intervene in ﬁnancial markets to provide
liquidity in times of crisis; and
3) Inﬂuence the exchange rate.  
Reserves—which are typically held in the form
of short-term, highly liquid, interest-bearing secu-
rities—also can be used to pay for ordinary gov-
ernment purchases from abroad or to repay debts
denominated in foreign currency.  The ﬁrst boxed
insert discusses the size and composition of reserves
over time.  
A large literature on the demand for reserves
has estimated the theoretical beneﬁts and costs of
holding reserves and has compared those predictions
to actual reserve holdings (Grubel, 1971; Lizondo
and Mathieson, 1987; Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb,
1992b).  Under a ﬁxed exchange rate system, such
as the Bretton-Woods system, the primary beneﬁt
of holding reserves is to permit the authorities to
directly ﬁnance a balance of payments deﬁcit rather
than pursuing undesirable macroeconomic or
exchange rate policies in the face of external pres-
sures.  Therefore, factors that make imbalances in
international payments larger or more variable—
like a higher volume of trade or more variable trade
and/or more variable international investment or
net factor income payments—increase the likeli-
hood of beneﬁting from holding reserves and tend
to raise the desired level of reserves.  Even under
ﬂoating rate systems—which constrain policy less
than ﬁxed-rate systems—policymakers often value
the options that holding reserves gives them. 
The opportunity cost of holding reserves is the
foregone investment because resources have been
used to purchase reserves instead of increasing
domestic capital.  Thus, the marginal product of
domestic capital is the opportunity cost of holding
reserves.  Often the marginal product of capital is
measured as the domestic interest rate.  Because of
information asymmetries, however, international
investment generally will be below the full-informa-
tion level and the marginal product of capital will
exceed the cost of funds in the global market (Ben-
Bassat and Gottlieb, 1992a).  Therefore, the domestic
interest rate probably is a lower bound on the oppor-
tunity cost of holding reserves.  Consequently, the
literature explains the demand for international
reserves as a tradeoff between the beneﬁts of
greater policy freedom and the costs of holding
reserves, i.e., the difference in return between
domestic and foreign investment.  
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION
The term foreign exchange intervention usually
describes sterilized intervention, which is explained
in the second boxed insert.  Several purposes for
intervention have been suggested.  First, many
researchers have found evidence for “leaning-against-
the-wind” intervention.  This has been deﬁned var-
4 One previous study has considered this question.  Mastropasqua,
Micossi, and Rinaldi (1988) evaluated the relationship of conﬁdential
European Monetary System intervention data for Belgium, France,
Germany, and Italy to reserve-based estimates of intervention and the
monetary base.  Despite considering a different group of countries in
a target-zone exchange rate regime and a different sample period, they
estimated correlations that are not much different than those presented
in this article: Interventions and reserve changes are loosely related.
Mastropasqua, Micossi, and Rinaldi (1988) did not, however, examine
the reasons why changes in reserves might differ from intervention or
how to improve those measures.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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There have been two unfulﬁlled predictions
about the size and composition of international
reserves.  First, at the end of the Bretton-Woods
era of ﬁxed exchange rates in 1973, it was widely
expected that countries would cease to hold sub-
stantial international reserves.  The major purpose
of reserves had been to intervene in support of the
Bretton-Woods exchange rate pegs.  If exchange rates
were to be allowed to ﬂoat, there didn’t seem to be
much point in holding substantial reserves (Batten,
1982).  Time has proven this prediction wrong.
The left panel of the ﬁgure shows that the total
ofﬁcial end-of-year holdings of foreign exchange
reserves—left-hand scale—as reported by the IMF,
has been increasing fairly steadily since 1970.  Its
percentage rate of increase—right-hand scale—
tailed off in 1992 and 1998, presumably as a result of
intervention during the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) and Asian crises, respectively.  
The second unfulﬁlled prediction is the immi-
nent downfall of the U.S. dollar as a dominant
reserve currency (see The Economist, 1994, or
Roberts, 1995). Central banks choose the curren-
cy composition of their international reserves on
many of the same grounds as other investors.
They seek to minimize risk for a given rate of
return on a portfolio of highly liquid assets.  In
practice, this means that reserve currencies typi-
cally are held because their assets are considered
relatively safe from political risk and are expected
to be subject to relatively low and stable inﬂation.
Since at least the Bretton-Woods conference of 1944,
the U.S. dollar has been the predominant interna-
tional reserve currency, succeeding the British
pound in the role.  The relative soundness of U.S.
political institutions and lack of regulation of U.S.
ﬁnancial markets have helped boost demand for
the dollar as a reserve currency.  
Several factors have led analysts to predict the
downfall of the dollar as a dominant reserve cur-
rency.  First, the large external, dollar-denominat-
ed U.S. debt creates an incentive for the United
States to reduce the real value of this debt with
inﬂation and may reduce the conﬁdence of interna-
tional investors in the dollar (The Economist, 1994).
Second, some analysts predicted the decline of the
dollar as a result of imprudent economic policy,
including high inﬂation, large trade deﬁcits, and a
resulting weakness in the international value of
the dollar (Roberts, 1995).  Finally, international
efforts to liberalize ﬁnancial systems will inevitably
weaken the dollar as a reserve currency by increas-
Percent
Notes: The left panel shows the holdings and changes in foreign exchange reserves.  The right panel shows the currency
composition of those reserves.  The codes GBP, FRF, CHF and NGL stand for the British pound, the French franc, the Swiss franc
and the Dutch guilder, respectively.
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iously as intervention that counters short-term
market trends—buying dollars as the dollar depre-
ciates (Taylor, 1982b), for example—or interven-
tion that is inconsistent with current or future funda-
mentals—buying dollars despite expectations of
lower U.S. interest rates in the future (Lewis, 1995;
Kaminsky and Lewis, 1996), for example.  Second,
intervention may be used to remedy “misalignments”
or exchange rates that are inconsistent with purchas-
ing power parity considerations (Gartner, 1987 and
1991; Neely, 1998).  Edison (1993) reports almost
universal and strong support for leaning-against-
the-wind intervention by monetary authorities but
relates less support for the idea that authorities
intervene to correct misalignments.
Although the U.S. Treasury has primary respon-
sibility for U.S. exchange rate policy, the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury generally collaborate on
foreign exchange intervention decisions, and the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducts opera-
tions on behalf of both.  The purpose of U.S.
intervention, as set out in the Foreign Currency
Directive,isto“counterdisorderlymarketconditions.”
The concept of “disorderly market conditions” is not
precisely deﬁned, but often has been interpreted as
includingperiodsofhighvolatility or abrupt changes
in exchange rates.  Intervention is conducted in a
manner consistent with the IMF Article IV, Section 1,
which forbids attempts to remedy balance of pay-
ments problems by manipulating exchange rates,
and is often undertaken in cooperation with foreign
central banks.5
Central banks are notoriously reluctant to
release data on their intervention operations.  The
Federal Reserve, along with the Treasury of the
United States, has been an exception to this rule,
releasing daily intervention data with a one-year
lag.  The Federal Reserve publishes data in the Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin on reserves valuation changes
and proﬁts/losses on intervention.6 Why do most
REVIEW
5The Foreign Currency Directive outlines the reasons for Federal
Reserve foreign currency transactions. It is published annually in both
the Federal Reserve Annual Report and in the Federal Reserve Bulletin
along with the minutes of the ﬁrst Federal Open Market Committee
meeting of the year.
6 Changes in U.S. foreign exchange reserves also are reﬂected in the
“other” asset category on the consolidated statement of all Federal
Reserve Banks published each Thursday in the H.4.1 statistical release.
ing the relative attractiveness of holding assets in
other currencies.1
The right panel of the ﬁgure shows that—after
a long decline—the role of the dollar as a reserve
currency actually has grown over the past decade.
The U.S. dollar has maintained and even increased
its importance as a reserve currency, though the
ﬁgures are sensitive to ﬂuctuations in exchange
rates.  Barring irresponsible U.S. economic policy,
any reduction in the importance of the U.S. dollar
as a reserve currency is likely to happen only
gradually.
What are the consequences if the dollar ceases
to be a reserve currency?  The only tangible ad-
vantage to being a reserve currency—as opposed
to having the dollar used internationally—is that
demand for dollar-denominated securities may
permit the United States to borrow from abroad at
slightly lower interest rates than otherwise would
be possible.  This ofﬁcial demand for U.S. assets
should widen the spread between U.S. government
and private bonds.  Blinder (1996), however, reports
that the U.S. spread is no larger than that of other
countries.  In other words, the spread does not show
that the dollar’s role as an international currency
has lowered the U.S. Treasury’s borrowing costs.  In
addition, the U.S. spread has widened slightly in
recent years, indicating that any reduction in bor-
rowing costs is not diminishing.  It is not clear that
Blinder’s argument is correct, however.  If govern-
ment and private bonds are (imperfect) substi-
tutes for some investors—even if not for foreign
central banks—arbitrage by those investors would
keep the interest rates on U.S. government and
private bonds reasonably close.  
While the advantages to having one’s currency
used as a reserve currency are modest, so are the
disadvantages.  The chief disadvantage to having
one’s currency used as a reserve currency is that
shifts in international portfolios can destabilize
the domestic economy.  The size of the U.S. econ-
omy mitigates these effects, however.
1 Despair about the dollar’s role as an international currency has not
been universal; see Frankel (1995) for example.
Continued from previous page.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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central banks keep interventions secret?  Taylor
(1982a and 1982b) suggests that the practice dates
back to the Bretton-Woods era of ﬁxed exchange
rates, when reports of intervention could trigger a
run on the currency.  Given that the practice has
persisted for more than 25 years after the end of
ﬁxed exchange rates, one also must consider the
possibility that central banks are reluctant to release
such information because they are trying to avoid
accountability.  Finally, it is possible that secret inter-
ventions—or at least concealing the size of inter-
vention—may make the transaction more effective
in inﬂuencing the exchange rate in certain circum-
stances (Bhattacharya and Weller, 1997).
Because exchange rates are important prices that
inﬂuence the time path of inﬂation and output, central
banks often intervene in the foreign exchange market,
buying and selling currency to inﬂuence exchange
rates.  Such intervention typically is sterilized, meaning
that the central bank reverses the effects of the foreign
exchange transactions on the monetary base.1 For
example, if the Federal Reserve Bank of New York—
following the instructions of the Treasury and the
Federal Open Market Committee—purchased $100
million worth of euros, the U.S. monetary base—com-
posed of U.S. currency in circulation plus deposits
of depository institutions at the Federal Reserve
Banks—would increase by $100 million in the absence
of sterilization.  This transaction is illustrated in the
stylized balance sheet items marked as (1).  To prevent
changes in domestic interest rates and prices, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York also would sell
$100 million worth of government securities—ster-
ilizing the intervention by reducing deposits with
the Federal Reserve—to absorb the liquidity.  This
transaction is marked as (2) in the balance sheet.
To prevent euro-denominated short-term interest
rates from rising, the European Central Bank would
have to conduct similar open market purchases of
euro-denominated securities to increase its money
stock to completely sterilize the original transaction.
The ﬁnal net effect of such a sterilized intervention
would be to increase the relative supply of U.S.
government securities versus euro-denominated
securities on the market.
Because sterilized intervention does not affect
the U.S. monetary base or interest rates, it cannot
inﬂuence the exchange rate through price or interest
rate channels.  It might, however, affect the exchange
rate through the portfolio balance channel and/or the
signaling channel.  The reasoning behind the port-
folio balance channel is that if foreign and domestic
bonds are imperfect substitutes, investors must be
compensated with a higher expected return to hold
the relatively more numerous bonds.  In the example
in which the Federal Reserve purchases euros/sells
dollars (USD), the intervention must result in an imme-
diate depreciation of the dollar that creates expec-
tations of future appreciation, increasing the expected
future return to dollar-denominated assets and con-
vincing investors to hold the greater quantity of them.
The signaling channel, on the other hand, suggests
that ofﬁcial intervention communicates to the market
information about future monetary policy or the
long-run equilibrium value of the exchange rate.
A purchase of euros/sale of dollars may signal to
the markets that the central bank considers the
dollar’s current value to be too high given current
and expected future policy.  The consensus of the
research on sterilized intervention is that any
inﬂuence intervention has on the exchange rate is
weak and temporary.2
1 Unsterilized intervention is equivalent to domestic monetary policy
and therefore is often implicitly excluded from discussions of the
efﬁcacy of intervention.
2Humpage (1999) provides some evidence that U.S. intervention may
inﬂuence dollar exchange rates.
Stylized Balance Sheet of the U.S. Monetary Authorities
Assets Liabilities
Foreign exchange reserves 1$100 million (1) Currency plus deposits held 1$100 million (1)
with the Federal Reserve 2$100 million (2)
U.S. government securities 2$100 million (2)
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WHY DO CHANGES IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE
RESERVES DIFFER FROM INTERVENTION?
Changes in reserves may not correspond to inter-
vention for a number of reasons.  First, the dollar value
of foreign exchange reserves will be subject to changes
in valuation from three sources:  changes in the foreign
exchange value of dollar, interest income, or coupon
payments, and changes in the value of the underlying
asset.  For example, if the Bank of Canada holds a
yen-denominated bond worth C$1 million, the value
of that bond will rise if the yen appreciates against
the Canadian dollar or if Japanese interest rates fall,
hiking the yen price of the bond.
Second, reserves often are used for transactions
other than intervention.  Ordinary government pur-
chases from abroad, or the payment of foreign currency-
denominated debt, can change reserves, but are not
intervention.  The United States, for example, issued
debt denominated in Swiss francs before the ﬁrst de-
valuation of the dollar in 1971 (Taylor, 1982a).  When
payments were made on this debt, they had to be
made in Swiss francs, which could have come from
the foreign exchange reserves of the United States.
Third, intervention may be disguised deliberately
so that it will not appear in reserve changes.  Taylor
(1982a and 1982b) reports that France, Italy, Spain,
and the United Kingdom hid intervention during the
1970s by having nationalized industries conduct some
transactions.7 Japan and France are reported to have
intervened with “hidden reserves”—of the authori-
ties—held at commercial banks.  France and Italy effect-
ively intervened by regulating the foreign exchange
portfolios of (mostly publicly held) commercial banks.
Finally, there are any number of unusual trans-
actions that might cause reserves to change without
corresponding foreign exchange intervention.  For ex-
ample, the IMF might allocate SDRs to a country, which
would increase its international reserves.  Or, assets
may be transferred from the ofﬁcial foreign reserves
accounts to another government entity.  Moreover,
intervention will not show up in changes in reserves at
all if it is conducted through the forward market and
offset with a spot transaction when the forward contract
is executed.8 These problems complicate the attempt
to equate changes in reserves with intervention.
COMPARING CHANGES IN RESERVES
TO INTERVENTION
To the extent that changes in reserves lead to
the same answer to the particular question under
investigation, reserves are a useful proxy for inter-
vention.  While we cannot replicate every study
using reserves to proxy for intervention, we can
compare characteristics of the series to see in what
respects they are similar.  For example, one might
hope that the series would be highly correlated and
would share similar autocorrelation functions.
The Data
We will use three samples of known interven-
tion data: 
1) U.S. daily intervention and monthly reserves
data from 1973:04 to 1998:12; 
2) Swiss daily intervention and monthly
reserves data from 1986:01 to 1995:12; and 
3) Bundesbank daily intervention in dollar mar-
kets and monthly reserves data from
1976:01 to 1996:10. 
In each case, the daily intervention data were
cumulated over calendar months to facilitate com-
parison with monthly changes in reserves.  
The intervention series for the United States
includes both in-market and with-customer transac-
tions.  In-market transactions are intended to inﬂu-
ence the exchange rate, while with-customer inter-
ventions are transactions with other government
entities that also change the relative supplies of
domestic and foreign bonds—like a payment to a
foreign government in foreign currency.9 The inter-
vention series for the Swiss National Bank includes
Swiss franc (CHF) purchases of U.S. dollars (USD)
and deutschemarks (DEM).  The German interven-
tion ﬁgures include only interventions in the USD
(non-EMS) market.  All intervention ﬁgures show
7 If a nationalized industry changes the mix of domestic and foreign
bonds that it either issues and/or holds in its portfolio, this will change
the relative supplies of such bonds available to the rest of the world,
just as a sterilized intervention would.  
8 Consider the following intervention through the forward market:
1) U.S. authorities purchase dollars forward.  2) At the expiration of
the forward contract, the U.S. authorities simultaneously sell dollars
in the spot market and purchase them under the forward contract.
During the duration of the forward contract, the intervention would
tend to support the dollar, but U.S. reserves would never change. 
9 The United States conducts most intervention in the DEM and JPY,
although other currencies have been used.  Neely and Weller (2000)
discuss the changing nature of intervention over time.  Adams and
Henderson (1983) and Humpage (1994) provide more information
on the institutional details of U.S. intervention.SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000 23
purchases of foreign exchange in millions of U.S.
dollars.  Note that in a coordinated intervention to
purchase dollars, U.S. intervention would be recorded
as a negative number—a sale of foreign exchange—
while German and Swiss intervention would be
recorded as a positive number.10
The foreign exchange reserves series for each
country were obtained from the IMF through Haver
Analytics.  The IMF obtained the ﬁgures from the
national authorities.  The reserves series are in mil-
lions of dollars.
The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates the inter-
vention series—cumulated over months—provided
by the central bank of each country, with the corre-
sponding changes in the foreign exchange reserves
series in the bottom panel.  For each country, the
changes in reserves appear to be far more variable
than the monthly intervention series, conﬁrming
that intervention is not the only reason for changes
in reserves.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics on the series;
the reserve series have far larger standard deviations
and mean absolute changes.  For example, the stan-
dard deviation of U.S. intervention is $860 million
while that of the change in U.S. foreign exchange
reserves is $1,275 million.  The mean absolute
change for each of those series is $355 million and
$741 million, respectively.  The intervention series
are all autocorrelated positively at the ﬁrst four lags.
The U.S. reserves series has smaller positive auto-
correlation at the ﬁrst four lags—ranging from 0.477
to 0.162—while the German and Swiss reserves
series are actually negatively autocorrelated at lags
one and two.  
Correlations Between Intervention and
Changes in Reserves  
Despite the greater volatility of the changes in
reserves, such a series might be a useful proxy for
intervention—depending on the application—if it
is correlated with intervention.  The third column
of Table 2 (labeled r) shows the correlations between
the measures over subsamples.11 The unconditional
correlations of the central bank intervention with
changes in foreign exchange reserves are modest,
equaling 0.423 for the United States, 0.192 for
Germany, and 0.123 for Switzerland.  
Correlations can change over time, however.  To
investigate the stability of this correlation over time,
we can compute a four-year rolling correlation
between central bank intervention and changes in
foreign exchange reserves.  Figure 2 displays the
backward-looking series of correlations from this
exercise.  Each of the time series of rolling correla-
tions shows relatively high correlations through the
1980s that fall off sharply during the early 1990s.  
Why do the correlations fall off during the
1990s?  Figure 3, which displays the product of the
interventions and changes in reserves, sheds some
light on this question.  For each country, there was
heavy intervention during 1987-89—the period fol-
lowing the 1987 Louvre Accords—that also was
reﬂected in changes in reserves, resulting in high
correlation during that period.  The falloff during
the 1990s seems to mostly reﬂect a lack of interven-
tion during the early-to mid-1990s (see the upper
panel of Figure 1), rather than a period of mixed
correlation with changes in reserves.  By the mid-
1990s, the heavy interventions of 1987-90 were no
longer included in the data window over which the
rolling correlations were computed.  In the case of
the United States, this instability in intervention
strategy reﬂects the fact that intervention is gener-
ally a political decision of the President and the
Secretary of the Treasury.  Intervention was rare,
for example, during the ﬁrst Reagan administration
from 1981-84 and during the Clinton administra-
tion after 1993. 
Omitting ERM Crises
Recall that the German data only include inter-
vention in dollar markets; they exclude intra-Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) intervention. Substantial
changes in reserves as a result of intervention to
support the ERM may be related negatively to the
dollar intervention series.  This suggests an investi-
gation is warranted of the German correlation after
excluding months of ERM realignments for major
currencies.  The months of ERM entrances, realign-
ments, or exits for the French franc (FRF), the Italian
lira (ITL), the Dutch guilder (NGL) and the British
pound (GBP) are 1979:09, 1981:03, 1981:10, 1982:06,
1983:03, 1985:07, 1986:04, 1987:01, 1990:01,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
10Results with other measures of intervention activity also were com-
puted for the United States and Switzerland.  In addition, results were
computed for each case with a broader measure of reserves, total
reserves minus gold. Those results will be omitted for the sake of
brevity, but were similar to those presented here.  The full set of
results is available from the author upon request. 
11The standard errors in Table 2 are those implied by the ﬁrst-order
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1992:09, and 1993:08.  The fourth column of Table
2 (labeled rEMS) displays the correlation results with
these months deleted.  Unsurprisingly, the correla-
tion between German dollar interventions and
changes in reserves increases from 0.192 to 0.264.
The corresponding correlation for Switzerland rises
much more modestly, from 0.123 to 0.132.  Figure
4 compares the time series of rolling correlations
for the German data with and without the realign-
ments.  The rolling correlations for the German
case still fall off sharply in the 1990s, even with
the realignment months removed.  
Whether the ERM crises are included or
omitted, the correlation between changes in
German reserves and intervention remains modest
over the whole sample. One reason for this might
be that foreign exchange swap transactions
frequently have been used to conduct monetary
policy (Batten et al, 1990).  For example, the
Bundesbank sold “Bundesbank Treasury discount
paper” to foreign investors beginning in March
1993 (Deutsche Bundesbank Annual Report, 1993). 
Deseasonalizing Changes in Reserves
The bottom rightmost panel of Figure 1 appears
to show that changes in Swiss reserves have a sea-
sonal component.  It also is possible that U.S. and
German reserve changes have a subtler seasonal
component.  This might potentially be of interest
since it is very unlikely that central bank interven-
tion has a seasonal element and ﬁltering out the
seasonal pattern in reserves might produce a
better—more highly correlated—proxy for central
bank intervention.  To investigate this possibility,
we regress changes in reserves on a set of indicator
variables spanning the months of the year.  While
there is no evidence of seasonality for the German
and United States reserves, there is overwhelming
evidence that Swiss reserve changes have a seasonal
component.  This is because the Swiss National Bank
accommodates a seasonal component in money
demand—smoothing interest rates over the course
of a year, as does the Federal Reserve—and conducts
these monetary policy operations with foreign
exchange reserves.12 Gartner (1987) notes this sea-
sonality and attributes it to the desire of banks and
ﬁnancial institutions to hold a greater quantity of
Swiss francs in their portfolios at the end of quarters.
While it is not clear that Gartner’s explanation
remains valid for recent years, Table 3 shows that it
is consistent with the overall behavior of the sample.
The largest and most statistically signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcients occur at the end of the ﬁnancial quar-
ters in March, June, September, and December.  The
months following these end-of-quarter months
show large negative coefﬁcients.  In other words, the
Swiss National Bank responds to seasonal ﬂuctua-
tions by buying foreign currency/selling Swiss francs
during March, June, September, and December and
selling foreign currency in the following month.
The ﬁfth column of Table 2 (labeled rSeason)
shows that the deseasonalized changes in Swiss
reserves exhibit higher correlation with interven-
tion data—0.215 versus 0.123—than the raw changes
in reserves.  Thus, to obtain a better proxy for Swiss
intervention, changes in reserves should be desea-
sonalized.  Consistent with the lack of regression
evidence of seasonality for Germany and the United
States, correlations for those cases change much
less.  Figure 5 compares the time series of rolling
correlations for the Swiss data with and without
the seasonal adjustment.  The seasonal adjustment
substantially raises the rolling correlation through
most of the sample.  
The overall correlation between Swiss reserves
and intervention remains fairly low, despite the adjust-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Figure 2












Four-Year Rolling Correlations Between
Official Intervention and Changes in Reserves
exchange reserves in each case.
Notes: Official intervention is measured as in-market and with-
customer intervention for the United States (Intv
US) as CHF
intervention in USD and DEM markets for the Swiss National
Bank (Intv
SW) and as USD (non-EMS) intervention for Germany
(Intv
G).  Reserves are measured as the dollar value of foreign
12The author thanks Mathias Zurlinden of the Swiss National Bank for
private communications regarding the role of monetary policy in gen-
erating seasonality in Swiss reserve changes.26   SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
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ment for seasonality.  As was the case for Germany, a
likely partial explanation for this low correlation is
that foreign exchange swaps were a major instrument
of Swiss monetary policy, causing ﬂuctuations in
Swiss reserves wholly unrelated to intervention.13
Revaluation of Reserves 
In principle, one might adjust changes in
reserves for valuation changes in the currency
and asset composition of the reserve portfolio. For
example, if the United States held its portfolio in
six-month JPY-denominated bonds, one could
approximate the change in the value of the port-
folio from changes in the JPY/USD exchange rate
and changes in Japanese six-month interest rates.  
In practice, adjusting reserves for valuation
changes is very difﬁcult. Countries do not typically 
13The use of foreign exchange in the conduct of Swiss monetary policy
is discussed by the Swiss National Bank at <http://www.snb.ch/e/
geldpolitik/geldpol.html>. The link was current as of March 10, 2000.
Summary Statistics on Central Bank Intervention and Changes in Reserves
Date 1 Date 2 m s |m| Min Max r1 r2 r3 r4
IntvUS 1973.04 1998.12 -31.0 859.8 355.0 -3413.2 6735.0 .477 .197 .182 .162
DFXRUS 1973.04 1998.12 116.5 1275.4 740.6 -7341.0 5667.0 .209 .154 .131 .080
IntvG 1976.01 1996.10 -150.0 713.4 380.0 -4895.4 1667.0 .471 .216 .145 .133
DFXRG 1976.01 1996.10 222.9 4968.8 1973.6 -31629.0 53242.0 -.241 -.151 .097 -.022
IntvSW 1986.01 1995.12 -12.0 94.7 34.0 -718.2 210.0 .193 .054 .088 .101
DFXRSW 1986.01 1995.12 143.5 1653.8 1199.0 -4686.0 5996.0 -.317 -.311 .435 -.241
NOTES:  The columns of the table show the beginning and ending dates of samples, the means, standard deviations,
mean absolute values, minimum and maximum for monthly intervention and changes in reserves. r1 through r4 denote
the ﬁrst four autocorrelation coefﬁcients of each series.  The variable names are as follows: IntvUS is in-market and with-
customer purchases; DFXRUS is the change in U.S. foreign exchange reserves; IntvG is German dollar purchases; DFXRG is
the change in German foreign exchange reserves; IntvSW is Swiss franc (CHF) purchases of USD and DEM; and DFXRSW is
the change in Swiss foreign exchange reserves. Variables are measured in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Table 1
Correlations Between Central Bank Intervention and Changes in Reserves
No adjustment for valuation changes Adjusted for valuation changes
variables r (s.e.) rEMS (s.e.) rSeason (s.e.) r (s.e.) rEMS (s.e.) rSeason (s.e.)
United States IntvUS DFXRUS 0.423 (0.026) 0.420 (0.027) 0.421 (0.026) 0.419 (0.026) 0.416 (0.027) 0.417 (0.026)
Germany IntvG DFXRG 0.192 (0.028) 0.264 (0.030) 0.203 (0.028) 0.198 (0.028) 0.273 (0.030) 0.209 (0.028)
Switzerland IntvSW DFXRSW 0.123 (0.034) 0.132 (0.032) 0.215 (0.022) 0.124 (0.034) 0.134 (0.032) 0.218 (0.022)
NOTES:  The third column of the table (labeled r) shows the implied unconditional correlation between the variables list-
ed in the second column and its standard error.  The standard errors are computed assuming a ﬁrst-order bivariate vec-
tor autoregression for each set of variables.  The fourth column (labeled rEMS) of the table shows the correlation between
the variables with the months of ERM realignments removed while the ﬁfth column (labeled rSeason) displays the correla-
tions with deseasonalized reserve changes.  The sixth through eighth columns of the table display the correlations after
crudely adjusting the changes in reserves for valuation changes as described in the text. The U.S. sample runs from
1973:04 to 1998:12, the German sample from 1976:01 to 1996:10 and the Swiss sample from 1986:01 to 1995:12.
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report the currency and asset composition of their
reserves portfolios and procedures for revaluing
reserves vary from country to country.  For example,
the Federal Reserve Bulletin publishes revalued U.S.
reserves ﬁgures each quarter, and reports that
those balances are marked to market monthly at
end-of-month exchange rates (Federal Reserve Bul-
letin, December 1999).14 The Swiss National Bank
values purchases of foreign exchange and interest
receipts at the exchange rate of the transaction and
also revalues its reserves annually at end-of-year
exchange rates (Swiss National Bank 91st Annual
Report, 1998). Before 1997, the Bundesbank valued 
reserves at historically low market exchange rates—
to conservatively estimate their DEM value—but
now values them on an average purchase cost basis
(Deutsche Bundesbank Annual Report, 1997). Finally,
the IMF uses end-of-month exchange rates to convert
reserves reported by national monetary authorities
in units of domestic currency to U.S. dollars and SDRs.
Table 4—reproduced from the Federal Reserve
Bulletin of December 1999—illustrates the proce-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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Normalized Cross Products of Intervention and Changes in Reserves
Notes:  The figure shows the normalized time series of the product of intervention and changes in foreign exchange reserves.  The




















14Reserves reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin do not correspond
precisely to those reported to the IMF by the Treasury.  The reasons
for this are not clear. 28   SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
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dures for revaluing U.S. reserves.  The ﬁrst line of
Table 4, for example, shows that the Federal Reserve
System Open Market Account (SOMA) held $6.944
billion worth of euros on June 30, 1999.15 Over
the next three months, this account earned $53
million in interest income and increased in value
by $225 million as a result of the appreciation of
the euro over the period, increasing the value of
this account to $7.222 billion. Although there were
no purchases or sales during this period, reserves
changed substantially. 
A very crude attempt at compensating for valu-
ation changes can be made under some assump-
tions about the currency composition and maturity
of foreign exchange reserves.  We will assume that
all foreign exchange reserves are held in dollars and
earn the 3-month Treasury bill yield.  These assump-
tions seem as reasonable as any other simple assump-
tions, given that most foreign exchange reserves
are denominated in dollars—see the boxed insert
on the Size and Composition of Currency Reserves—
and held in highly liquid, short-term assets.  But
any such assumptions are clumsy approximations.
Most obviously, the United States does not—by deﬁ-
nition—hold foreign exchange reserves in the form
of dollars.  But under these assumptions, we can
adjust the changes in reserves for estimated valua-
tion changes.  The right-hand columns of Table 2
show that adjustment for estimated valuation
changes makes only the most marginal improve-
ment in correlations among changes in reserves
and measures of intervention.  The German corre-
lation that excludes realignments (rEMS) rises from
0.264 to 0.273 with valuation changes while the
Swiss deseasonalized correlation (rSeason) rises from
0.215 to 0.218.  U.S. correlations fall by 0.004. 
CONCLUSION
Because of the scarcity of data on ofﬁcial foreign
exchange intervention, researchers commonly have
used monthly changes in international reserves to
proxy for intervention.  This article has explored
the question of whether changes in reserves are good
proxies for central bank intervention by examining
some simple statistical measures.  Changes in re-
serves are correlated positively with intervention
activity, but may not be correlated strongly.  The use
Figure 4












Four-Year Rolling Correlations Between
German Official Intervention and Changes
in Reserves Adjusted for ERM Realignments
Notes:  The panel compares 48-month rolling correlations
between dollar intervention and changes in reserves for
Germany, with and without months of ERM realignments.
Coefﬁcients on Seasonal Indicator Variables




March  630.4 (160.3)
April -955.8 (157.2)
May  354.7 (157.2)
June  993.5 (157.2)
July  -993.6 (157.2)
August 203.2 (157.2)
September  800.0 (157.2)
October -562.4 (157.2)
November  579.6 (157.2)
December  2810.2 (157.2)
NOTES: The 2nd and 3rd columns display coefﬁcients and standard errors
from a regression of changes in Swiss foreign exchange reserves (DFXR-
SW) on a full set of seasonal indicator variables over the full sample avail-
able, 1973:4 to 1999:1.
Table 3
15Note that the foreign currency holdings of the United States are split
between the accounts of the Federal Reserve System (SOMA) and those
of the Treasury, the exchange stabilization fund. Normally, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York apportions half of intervention operations
on the Treasury’s books and half to the Federal Reserve’s books.SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000      29
of foreign exchange instruments for domestic mon-
etary policy by Germany and Switzerland might sig-
niﬁcantly detract from the correlation.  It is difﬁcult
to say whether changes in reserves are an adequate
proxy for intervention because the answer to that
question may depend on the issue being researched.
Filtering the reserves data to compensate for
known features, like seasonality and ERM realign-
ments, can increase the correlation of changes in
reserves with intervention, making it a better proxy.
After ﬁltering out months of ERM realignments and
crudely adjusting for valuation changes, the correla-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Foreign Currency Holdings of U.S. Monetary Authorities Based on Current
Exchange Rates, 1999:Q3
Millions of dollars
Quarterly changes in balance, by source
Net Currency Interest Balance
Balance purchases Effect of Investment valuation accrual (net) Sept. 30,




EMU euro 6,943.7 0.0 0.0 53.0 225.1 0.0 7,221.8
Japanese yen 7,786.9 0.0 0.0 2.0 1,043.0 0.0 8,831.9
Total 14,730.6 0.0 0.0 55.0 1,268.1 0.0 16,053.7
Interest receivables4 68.4 … … … … -17.3 51.1
Other cash ﬂow
from investments5 68.4 … … … … 13.4 13.4
Total 14,799.0 0.0 0.0 55.0 1,268.1 -3.9 16,118.2
U.S. TREASURY EXCHANGE
STABILIZATION FUND (ESF)
EMU euro 6,944.6 0.0 0.0 49.3 225.2 0.0 7,219.1
Japanese yen 7,787.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1,042.8 0.0 8,831.8
Total 14,731.6 0.0 0.0 51.3 1,268.0 0.0 16,050.9
Interest receivables4 45.5 … … … … 20.7 66.2
Other cash ﬂow
from investments5 … … … … … 13.3 13.3
Total 14,777.1 0.0 0.0 51.3 1,268.0 34.0 16,130.4
NOTE:  Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.
1Purchases and sales for the purpose of this table include foreign currency sales and purchases related to ofﬁcial activity,
swap drawings and repayments, and warehousing.
2This ﬁgure is calculated using marked-to-market exchange rates: It represents the difference between the sale exchange
rate and the most recent revaluation exchange rate.
3Foreign currency balances are marked-to-market monthly at month-end exchange rates.
4Interest receivables for the ESF are revalued at month-end exchange rates. Interest receivables for the Federal Reserve
System are carried at average cost of acquisition and are not marked to market until interest is paid. Interest receivables
for the Federal Reserve System are net of unearned interest collected.
5Values for cash ﬂow differences from payment and collection of funds between quarters.
… Not applicable.
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin
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tion between German dollar intervention and changes
in foreign exchange reserves is 0.273.  Seasonally
adjusting Swiss foreign exchange reserves and
approximating valuation changes raises the corre-
lation with Swiss franc intervention to 0.218.  No
adjustments to U.S. foreign exchange reserves data
improve the correlation of 0.423 with in-market
and with-customer intervention. Further research
on how well changes in reserves proxy for interven-
tion might compare directly the results of interven-
tion studies using each kind of data. 
In addition to removing seasonal factors and
unusual periods like ERM realignments, other items
for which one might adjust reserves include known
government purchases out of reserves, repayment
of foreign currency-denominated debt, and transac-
tions like allocation of SDRs.  To compensate for
valuation changes to reserves would require knowl-
edge of the currency and asset composition of each
country’s international reserves and the institutional
procedures for revaluation.  These adjustments
would be difﬁcult and time-consuming.  
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